On track with Teheran: Shift in India's West Asia strategy

Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to Iran lends substance to aspirations for a close relationship between the two countries which is based as much on historical factors as mutual interest defining the future. Geopolitical realities emanating from the Talibanisation of Afghanistan, the emergence of the Central Asian republics after the break-up of the Soviet Union, and the enormous economic opportunities for trade in natural gas to India and science-based services and products from India to Iran provide the imperatives of a strategic relationship between the two countries. The inclusion of a strong group of business leaders in the prime minister's delegation provided the necessary economic thrust to this visit, which was a major factor in the announcement of a $200-million line of credit by the Indian government. By virtue of its relatively large population and abundant hydrocarbon resources, Iran will perhaps emerge as a much greater power in West Asia than the world has acknowledged. A fact that generally goes unnoticed is the establishment of democracy in Iran after the revolution of 1979 which has become stronger over the years, even though it was born out of revolution which had a bloody and brutal component. There is also a shift in the mood of the people in Iran towards a more liberal ethos, particularly with a growing percentage of young people who were born after the revolution. Prime Minister Khatami's greatest support comes from this section of the population. This is the group most likely to be appreciative of India's secular credentials and the policy of religious tolerance, which though fractured periodically by our own religious fundamentalists, still survives. The new Iran that is asserting itself through its younger generation is as apprehensive as we are of the spread of terrorism, the Sunni intolerance of the Shia minority in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and of the antediluvian power of the mullahs in Iran itself. India can play a useful role in changing the perceptions of the US administration about Iran and in bringing about a lifting of sanctions by the US which have been in place over 20 years now. With India's growing cordiality with the world's sole superpower, the changing geopolitics of the Gulf region, and the threat of growing terrorism breeding in Afghanistan, this role for India becomes feasible and important. The Vajpayee visit should succeed in repairing the damage brought about with the demolition of the Babri masjid, which was only partially reversed by Mr Narasimha Rao's visit to Iran and Mr Rafsanjani's visit to India. The Taliban had only helped create a stronger rationale for full rapprochement than would emerge from the inherent aspirations of the two societies. But to build a firm foundation for a stronger relationship in the future, a much more meaningful economic base would have to be structured. Here the natural gas pipeline from Iran to India becomes the main pillar of the edifice that would provide lasting mutual benefits in the future for both countries. It was in 1989 that Ali Shams Ardekani, then deputy foreign minister in Iran, and I had developed a proposal for a pipeline transporting gas to India and Pakistan overland. This was presented at an international conference in New Delhi in January 1990. The initial official response to this concept was generally negative in India. But over the last 10 years it has become an important part of India's energy strategy, and during Mr Vajpayee's visit the feasibility of the pipeline was discussed in some detail. As a result, Iran has agreed to study the possibility of a deep-sea pipeline to India, since India is not in favour of an overland route via Pakistan. Undoubtedly, the deep-sea option would be far more expensive than the overland arrangement but official reaction in India to the possibility of Pakistan's involvement is strongly negative. The reasons cited are the risk of Pakistan turning the spigot to threaten supplies to India and the payment of large transit fees by India to Pakistan, which would provide the latter with a steady income that would help its economy. Of course, overall India would stand to benefit too with a much lower cost of gas received in India in comparison with the use of the under-sea route. Several means could be adopted by India in pursuing the overland option through Pakistan which would minimise the risk of any misadventure by Pakistan and ensure relatively high security of supply. In essence, if the project has such stakeholders as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, international financial institutions, and the private sector in both India and Pakistan, and the contractual arrangements for supply of gas involve payments only for gas actually received in India, there would be very low risk of deliberate disruption. Besides, there could be stiff penalties for Pakistan for any disruption, and other stakeholders downstream could be introduced such as through supply of CNG to Japan and Korea from India and supply of electricity to Pakistan itself using gas received in India. At any rate, for the present, assessing the feasibility of a deep-sea pipeline would help in creating a choice which would help in arriving at a rational decision. Over and above trade in hydrocarbons, which would involve trade flows in one direction only, India can help set up several infrastructure projects in Iran, including power generation and supply, railway infrastructure, and modernisation of Iran's IT and telecommunications facilities. Even more valuable to the two countries for building future relations would be large-scale training of Iranian personnel in several fields such as agriculture, biotechnology, IT, medicine and several industries. In the final years of the Shah's regime, relations between India and Iran had reached a very satisfactory level. Indira Gandhi, as prime minister, is known to have consulted the Shah regularly on matters related to India's policies towards West Asia, including minor issues such as whether India should allow its doctors to serve in a particular country. It would be necessary for our government to retain high-level contact with Iran and give it due importance in defining our policies in the region as a whole. In other words, Indo-Iranian relations have to be imparted a strategic dimension visible on both sides.