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THE BELÉM PACKAGE

Recasting Ambition, Equity, and Finance in the Next Phase of Climate Action

A COP30 Debriefing Paper



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CONTENTS

Background

The 30th annual meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP30) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and 7th meeting of the CMA[1] convened in Belém from 10-22 November 2025. This marked a decade since the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015. The Brazilian presidency framed the meeting as the "Global Mutirão", a collective effort to move from commitments to implementation. It approached its leadership by prioritising partnerships not only among countries but also with institutional actors within and beyond UNFCCC. This approach appeared pragmatic, given the prevailing geopolitical circumstances that continued to cast doubt on the stability of the multilateral code of collective climate governance.

At the heart of an implementation agenda is the concern about its practicality and robustness towards achieving the Paris Agreement goals, particularly the aspiration to limit the temperature rise to 1.5°C. Additionally, thrust is whether means of implementation – particularly financial flows – are aligned with the goals of transitioning to a low-carbon and climate resilient future (Article 2, Paris Agreement).

Decisions taken by previous COPs informed the purpose of negotiations at Belém. These included (a) the UAE Consensus call to transition away from fossil fuels "in a just, orderly and equitable manner" along with tripling of renewable energy and doubling of energy-efficiency by 2030; (b) the Emirates Framework for Global Climate Resilience, which laid the ground for the Global Goal on Adaptation; and (c) the Baku outcome on the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG), which sets the target of mobilising at least USD 300 billion per year by developed countries and overall goal is to "scaling-up" of financing to developing countries to USD 1.3 trillion by 2025. Together, these decisions set mitigation and adaptation signposts that COP30 was expected to operationalise.

The Brazilian Presidency placed four interconnected pillars at the centre – decarbonisation, the NCQG, activation of the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), and just transition. The Presidency invited Parties to "roll up their sleeves" and work in a 'Global Mutirão' – a collective mobilisation to stitch ambition, adaptation, finance, transparency and cooperation into a single tapestry. In this process, for developing countries-especially India – the implementation tone mattered: equity and common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) were not side notes but the frame within which implementation would proceed.

The outcome of the COP30 acknowledges that the first Global Stocktake (GST1) – completed at COP28 – marks the end of the Paris Agreement's first implementation cycle and shows measurable progress in bending the emissions curve and advancing adaptation planning. The GST1 also underscores large ambition and implementation gaps – particularly in adaptation and finance - highlighting the urgency of accelerated action, stronger multilateralism, and scaled-up resources to keep 1.5°C within reach. Despite firm stances taken by Parties, the Brazilian Presidency was able to pull through agreements on a Global Mechanism on Just Transition, adoption of about 60 indicators on Global Goal on Adaptation with flexibility to countries in their application, tripling of adaptation finance and a two year programme on implementing the Baku to Belém Roadmap on climate finance, opening a negotiation track on para 9.1 of the Paris Agreement on developed countries' obligation on climate finance, along with a promise from the Presidency to prepare a roadmap for consideration on fossil-fuel phase out by the next COP. The decision to establish a dialogue on the contentious issue of countries such as climate-related unilateral trade measures, triggered by the EU's introduction of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), also deepens the scope of global governance of climate change relative to other institutional architectures of global economic governance.

Arguably, the Belém outcome has commenced a new chapter of climate diplomacy, aiming to

[1] *Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement*

synchronise policy processes and actors within and beyond the UNFCCC, deemed necessary for the full and effective implementation of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. Multi-country initiatives like the International Solar Alliance (ISA) and the Tropical Forests Forever Facility (TFFF) illustrates how non-UNFCCC platforms have moved to the centre – stage of implementation, providing a model of support that developing countries expect from developed countries. Similarly, the adoption of GGA indicators as a harmonising factor across diverse national circumstances and subjective vulnerabilities reflects the necessity of a two-tier governance approach: global governance linked with country-specific flexibility.

Negotiations stretched well past midnight on multiple occasions, particularly over contentious issues such as finance. Ultimately, the Mutirão decision emerged as the political centrepiece of COP30, signalling that delivery would become people-centred, nature-conscious, protective of rights, and respectful of sovereignty. It is not a binding instruction manual; it is a political reality of future cooperation. Though not a binding instruction manual, it represents a shared political understanding on how future cooperation should unfold. It leaves room for a development-first mitigation pathway that expands energy access, decarbonises industry and builds resilience without importing conditionalities through the back door.

The Mutirão Decision: A Political Blueprint for Delivering the Paris Agreement

The Mutirão decision, represents the centrepiece of the Brazilian Presidency's effort to shift the climate regime from negotiation to implementation. The decision bundles ambition, adaptation, finance, and cooperation into a single political package designed to accelerate delivery while safeguarding equity and national circumstances. The Mutirão decision operationalises the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC) by embedding flexibility, equity, and cooperation into its design. Rather than imposing uniform obligations, it establishes two voluntary platforms: the Belém Mission to 1.5°C, which aims to catalyse higher ambition in Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and long-term strategies, and the Global Implementation Accelerator, which focuses on translating existing pledges into tangible action through partnerships, technology transfer, and finance facilitation. These platforms allow countries to raise ambition and accelerate implementation at their own pace, consistent with national circumstances. It explicitly links ambition to enabling conditions such as finance, technology transfer, and capacity building, reaffirming that developed countries must fulfil Article 9.1 obligations to support developing nations. By avoiding prescriptive fossil fuel phase-out mandates and emphasising facilitative dialogues, the decision ensures that global progress respects differentiated responsibilities while fostering collective action. These facilitative platforms are part of a broader strategy to address systemic barriers beyond the energy or adaptation sectors. In this context, the decision also signals a commitment to structured dialogues on climate-related trade measures – an unprecedented move within the UNFCCC – acknowledging concerns that unilateral instruments could penalise developing-country exports and undermine equitable transitions. On finance, the Mutirão anchors a two-year work programme to operationalise the Baku-to-Belém roadmap, linking Article 9 obligations with scaled-up flows toward the NCQG and clarifying complementarity with Article 2.1(c). For adaptation, it reinforces the adoption of voluntary Global Goal on Adaptation indicators, ensuring flexibility and respect for national contexts.

Politically, the Mutirão avoids contentious language on the fossil-fuel phase-out, opting instead for cooperative, ambition-raising consistent with the UAE Consensus and national circumstances – a compromise that developing countries, including India, viewed as essential to prevent inequitable burdens in the absence of commensurate finance. Its significance lies in shifting the focus toward implementation, embedding equity safeguards, and creating practical venues for aligning ambition, finance, and technology. For the first time, the

UNFCCC process has established a dialogue (2026-2028) to examine unilateral climate related trade measures, opening a multilateral avenue to contest trade restrictions that could penalise developing country exports and industrial pathways, aligning with India's stance on equity and CBDR-RC. The road ahead will test whether these facilitative mechanisms can translate political signals into measurable progress before the next GST in 2028.

Throughout negotiations, India strongly supported Brazil's inclusive presidency and worked to embed CBDR-RC principles across decisions. It consistently emphasised that ambition must be linked to enabling conditions – particularly Article 9.1 finance obligations – and opposed any attempt to dilute these commitments through systemic finance agendas or unilateral trade measures like CBAM. India also advocated for flexibility in the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) indicators, ensuring they remain voluntary and non-prescriptive, and welcomed the adoption of the Just Transition Work Programme, which aligns with India's domestic focus on protecting workers, communities, MSMEs, and avoid regional imbalances during decarbonisation.

Table 1. Belém Mission to 1.5°C and Global Implementation Accelerator

	Belém Mission to 1.5°C	Global Implementation Accelerator
Primary Goal	Raise ambition: Encourage countries to strengthen NDCs and align with the 1.5°C pathway.	Deliver action: Help countries implement existing pledges and commitments effectively.
Focus Area	Political and technical dialogue on ambition, pathways, and enabling conditions (finance, tech).	Practical support for execution – projects, partnerships, and investment mobilization.
Nature	Non-binding, catalytic: Creates momentum for ambition ahead of next NDC cycle.	Operational platform: Facilitates real-world implementation and scaling of solutions.
Key Activities	Convene ambition dialogues. Identify gaps in NDCs. Mobilize political will.	Match countries with finance and technology. Accelerate renewable deployment, adaptation projects, and just transition programs.
Time Horizon	Short-term push before 2030 NDC updates.	Continuous support for implementation through 2030 and beyond.

The COP30 Mitigation Package

Pragmatism on Fossil Fuel Phase-Out

At COP30, mitigation-related negotiations unfolded as one of the most politically charged arenas, reflecting deep divides over ambition and equity. From the outset, the European Union, several Latin American countries such as Colombia, and coalitions like AOSIS (Alliance of Small Island States) and Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) pressed hard for a clear, UNFCCC-mandated roadmap to phase out fossil fuels. These groups argued that anything less would undermine the credibility of the Paris Agreement and criticised late drafts for omitting explicit fossil fuel language - gap they viewed as incompatible with science-based pathways. On the other side, major hydrocarbon producers and several large emerging economies, including Saudi Arabia, Gulf states, Russia, and parts of the LMDC (Like-Minded Group of Developing Countries) group, resisted sector-specific mitigation prescriptions. They insisted that energy transitions must respect national circumstances and the principle of equity, warning that rigid timelines without commensurate finance would impose disproportionate transition burdens on developing countries. This clash over fossil fuel phase out roadmap created a real risk of deadlock, with some Parties threatening to reject the cover decision if their concerns were ignored.

Brazil's Presidency eventually steered the process toward a compromise. Rather than embedding a binding fossil fuel phase-out roadmap in the COP text, it proposed voluntary "roadmaps" outside the formal decision text, coupled with two new initiatives: the Belém Mission to 1.5°C, aimed at catalysing ambition in NDCs and long-term strategies, and the Global Implementation Accelerator, designed to turn pledges into tangible projects through partnerships, technology transfer, and finance facilitation. These platforms are non-binding but politically influential, creating cooperative spaces for ambition-raising without new compliance obligations.

For developing countries, this outcome was politically significant. It preserved policy space, avoided inequitable obligations, and tied ambition to support under Article 9.1. The decision reflects a pragmatic balance: ambition will advance through cooperation and facilitation rather than coercion, keeping equity at the heart of the transition debate.

Advancing Mitigation through the Sharm el-Sheikh Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Programme

The mitigation package also reaffirmed the Sharm el-Sheikh Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Programme[2], which continues to serve as a forum for sharing best practices and identifying implementation barriers. As reaffirmed and advanced at COP30, the programme is designed to bridge the gap between climate pledges and real-world delivery. Originally launched at COP27, the programme provides a structured, facilitative space for Parties to share best practices, identify barriers, and mobilise support for implementing mitigation actions aligned with the Paris Agreement's temperature goals. At Belém, the decision emphasised continuity and integration: the work programme will complement the GST follow-up and interact closely with new initiatives such as the Belém Mission to 1.5°C and the Global Implementation Accelerator. Its scope remains non-prescriptive, respecting national circumstances and equity principles, while encouraging technical exchanges on sectoral decarbonisation, enabling policies, and finance mobilisation. Importantly, COP30 reinforced that ambition cannot be divorced from implementation – countries are expected to bring forward concrete examples of projects, regulatory reforms, and investment needs, rather than abstract commitments. For developing countries, including India, the programme offers a cooperative venue to spotlight enabling conditions – such as concessional finance, technology transfer, and capacity building – that are essential for scaling renewables, electrifying industry, and improving

[2] *Sharm el-Sheikh (COP27, 2022), where the Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Programme was first established.*

efficiency. By embedding the work programme within the broader implementation architecture, COP30 signalled that mitigation progress will be measured not by new declarations but by tangible, on-ground actions supported through multilateral cooperation.

Just and Inclusive Transition: Strengthening the UAE Work Programme at COP30

The UAE Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) was operationalised at COP30, following its launch at COP28[3], marking a significant step in embedding social equity within the climate regime. The Mutirão decision consolidates a formal framework under the UNFCCC to guide countries in designing and implementing transitions that are fair, inclusive, and responsive to diverse national circumstances. It emphasises that just transition is not limited to the energy sector but spans entire economies, requiring integrated approaches that link climate action with labour rights, social protection, skills development, and respect for indigenous and local communities. The programme is facilitative and non-prescriptive, creating a cooperative space for Parties to share experiences, identify barriers, and mobilise resources for worker upskilling, building resilience of MSMEs, and regional economic diversification. COP30 also underscored the need for knowledge exchange and capacity building, encouraging partnerships between governments, civil society, and international organisations. For developing countries such as India, the JTWP offers a multilateral channel to access technical assistance and finance for coal-dependent regions, informal workers, and vulnerable communities, ensuring that decarbonisation does not exacerbate inequality. By institutionalising just transition within the UNFCCC, COP30 signals that climate ambition must go hand in hand with social justice, making the JTWP a cornerstone for equitable implementation in the years ahead. Although, another track on gender justice, still has a long way to go.

The Belém Breakthrough on Global Goal on Adaptation

At COP30 in Belém, Parties adopted the Belém Adaptation Indicators and formally concluded the UAE-Belém work programme on indicators, marking the first time the Paris Agreement's Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) received an operational, global set of measures to track collective progress. The decision situates adaptation firmly within the Paris "ambition-implementation" cycle, clarifies how progress should be assessed without creating new reporting burdens, and preserves equity by reaffirming national discretion. In plain terms: countries now share a common, voluntary language for adaptation – one that governments can use to plan, implement, and communicate resilience-building, while the UNFCCC can use to aggregate global progress without turning indicators into implicit compliance tools. The COP30 decision underscores that these indicators are not a checklist, not a ranking mechanism, and not a precondition for finance. They are a toolset to help countries plan and learn, and to help the UNFCCC summarise global progress in a facilitative manner.

The adopted text emphasises several principles. First, the Belém Adaptation Indicators are voluntary, non-prescriptive, non-punitive and global in nature; they are not intended for cross-country comparison and must not create additional reporting burdens, especially for developing countries. Second, the decision reaffirms that work on the GGA must reflect equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC), be country-driven, and respect national sovereignty. Third, the decision concludes the UAE–Belém technical process, treating the final list of potential indicators produced by experts as a knowledge product that informed the adopted indicator set.

Politically, the COP30 outcome on adaptation sits alongside explicit implementation follow-ups to the

[3] *Dubai (COP28, 2023), where Parties launched the Just Transition Work Programme to advance equitable, inclusive, and people-centred transitions.*

Global Stocktake. Parties agreed that adaptation progress should feed into cooperative GST follow-up (e.g., the annual UAE dialogue), and the decision positions indicators to improve planning, identify barriers, and guide support – especially finance, technology and capacity building – without turning metrics into gatekeepers for access.

The central fault line ran between many developing countries and several developed countries over pace and framing. Developed countries pushed to "adopt now, refine later", arguing that delays in adopting indicators undermine implementation and signal low ambition; they favoured a rapid, structured list to begin tracking and learning. Developing countries cautioned that adoption without means of implementation – especially scaled, predictable finance – risked turning indicators into a burden, a de facto conditionality, or a basis for comparative ranking that could penalise vulnerability rather than support it. The COP30 decision reflects this tension by adopting indicators with strong safeguards: voluntary use, nonprescriptive application, explicit ban on cross-country comparisons, and the reaffirmation that indicators shall not create new reporting burdens.

This compromise also links to finance politics at Belém. Parties reiterated that Article 9 obligations (financial support by developed countries) remain essential, and they tied adaptation tracking to broader GST follow-up and facilitative dialogues designed to surface barriers (including access to finance) and crowd in support. In effect, the GGA decision anchors measurement but makes clear that delivery depends on enabling conditions negotiated across the COP30 package.

The Belém Adaptation Indicators correspond to the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience adopted at COP28 and refined through the UAE–Belém work programme. The decision's operative text and annex frame indicators across thematic areas (e.g., water, food, health, ecosystems, infrastructure, livelihoods/cultural heritage) and dimensions (risk assessment, planning, implementation, monitoring & learning). The formulation is flexible: countries select and adapt relevant indicators, embed them in national systems (e.g., NAP-National Action Plans, sector plans etc.), and report progress voluntarily – often through existing vehicles such as adaptation communications or biennial transparency reports (BTRs) – so as not to duplicate effort.

The table below groups key themes and indicators consistent with the UAE-Belém work programme's knowledge products and the COP30 decision's annex (examples are indicative and country adaptable, and not prescriptive.

Table 2: Overview of COP30 Adaptation Indicators

Theme	What COP30's Decision Emphasises	Illustrative Indicators (Voluntary / Country-Adaptable)
Water	Secure water availability, manage droughts/floods, climate proof storage and distribution	Share of population with climate resilient potable water; % of critical water infrastructure with flood/drought risk management plans; proportion of basins with integrated water resource management incorporating climate scenarios(1)(3)

Theme	What COP30's Decision Emphasises	Illustrative Indicators (Voluntary / Country-Adaptable)
Food & Agriculture	Reduce climate risks to food systems; support climate resilient production and supply chains	% of farmers covered by climate advisories/early warnings; area under climate resilient practices (e.g., micro irrigation, drought tolerant crops); post harvest loss reduction in climate affected districts (1)(3)
Health	Address heat stress, vector borne disease shifts, disaster morbidity	# of cities with heat health action plans; coverage of climate sensitive disease surveillance; hospital/clinic climate proofing rate in high risk areas (1)(3)
Ecosystems & Nature	Conserve/restore ecosystems acting as carbon sinks and buffers	Hectares of restored/protected ecosystems with resilience co benefits; % of conservation plans considering climate risks; community stewardship structures in high risk landscapes (1)(3)
Infrastructure & Human Settlements	Ensure continuity of essential services under climate stress	% of critical infrastructure (power, transport, water) with climate risk assessments and continuity plans; resilient housing upgrades in flood/heat prone areas; climate risk aligned urban planning instruments (1)(3)
Livelihoods & Cultural Heritage	Protect vulnerable livelihoods; preserve heritage at climate risk	# of targeted livelihood programmes in climate exposed districts; inclusion of cultural heritage resilience in local plans; social protection coverage for climate shocks (1)(3)
Cross cutting: Risk, Planning, Implementation, Learning	Build systemic capacity; integrate adaptation across policies; learn iteratively	Existence/quality of national risk assessments; share of sector plans with adaptation components; # of implemented adaptation projects with monitoring frameworks; periodic learning reports informing policy updates (1)(3)

With the indicators adopted, Parties are encouraged to map existing national efforts to the indicator set – water resource management, climate smart agriculture, health preparedness, resilient infrastructure – and use voluntary communications (e.g., NAPs, adaptation communications, BTRs) to share progress without duplicating reporting. In parallel, countries can bring barriers and needs – data gaps, institutional capacity, financing constraints – into GST follow-up dialogues, which are expressly designed to be cooperative and nonprescriptive. For developing countries, the GGA decision's safeguards are particularly salient. It protects against indicators becoming hidden conditionalities or trade related compliance tools, and it ties measurement to means of implementation conversations (finance, technology, capacity) across the COP30 package. In other words, adoption of indicators does not shift the burden to vulnerable countries; it provides a common language to explain what support is needed and why. Substantively, the GGA decision is a governance milestone: adaptation is now treated with the same procedural seriousness as mitigation. Politically, it is a compromise that defuses concerns about measurement becoming coercive while advancing a practical way to track resilience. Operationally, it sets countries up to learn iteratively, refine indicators, and improve planning and budget alignment over time – ideally with scaled finance flowing through reformed access channels under the Financial Mechanism and complementary cooperation.

Means of Implementation: Finance, Equity and Systemic Reforms at COP30

Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue on the scope of Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement and its complementarity with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement

The COP30 decision on the Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue regarding Article 2.1(c) and its complementarity with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement provides critical clarity on the relationship between systemic finance alignment efforts and the legally binding obligation of developed countries to provide climate finance. Article 2.1(c) calls for "making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development," while Article 9.1 explicitly requires developed countries to provide financial resources to developing countries for mitigation and adaptation. At Belém, Parties agreed that these provisions are complementary but not interchangeable, and the decision categorically states that Article 2.1(c) is not a substitute for Article 9.1. This affirmation was politically significant for developing countries, which feared that growing emphasis on global financial system reforms could dilute or replace the core obligation of public climate finance under Article 9.

The decision frames the dialogue as facilitative and non-prescriptive, ensuring that efforts to align finance flows respect national circumstances, sovereignty, and equity principles. It explicitly rejects punitive measures or new reporting burdens for developing countries. For the Global South, this is a major safeguard: it preserves the integrity of Article 9.1 and reinforces that developed countries remain responsible for predictable, scaled-up, and grant-based support. This clarity strengthens trust in the multilateral process and ensures that systemic reforms – such as green taxonomies or private-sector mobilisation – are treated as complementary enablers, not replacements for public finance obligations.

The COP30 outcome also sets a structured timeline of dialogues and work programmes on finance through 2028, which is crucial for shaping the next phase of climate finance architecture. The two-year work programme on climate finance, launched at Belém, will operationalise the Baku-to-Belém roadmap and feed into negotiations on the NCQG, targeting at least USD 300 billion in public finance per year by 2035 from developed countries to developing countries. Annual GST implementation dialogues will run through 2027, providing a cooperative space to surface barriers and enablers, including finance access. In parallel, the Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue will continue examining Article 2.1(c) alignment without undermining Article 9 obligations. These overlapping timelines matter because they create multiple entry points for developing countries to influence design,

secure concessional flows, and ensure equity safeguards before the next stocktake in 2028. *For countries like India, this sequencing offers a roadmap to push for systemic reforms while defending core obligations – making finance discussions a central pillar of climate diplomacy in the coming years.*

For developing countries, the significance lies in preventing a narrative shift where systemic financial reforms (such as green taxonomies or private-sector mobilisation) overshadow the core obligation of public finance. The decision ensures that climate finance discussions remain anchored in equity and CBDR-RC, while allowing constructive dialogue on how broader financial systems can complement – not replace – these commitments. By drawing this clear boundary, COP30 strengthens trust in the multilateral process and sets the stage for future negotiations on the NCQG, ensuring that ambition on finance flows does not erode the foundational principle of support for developing countries.

The Adaptation Fund: Much Needed Push for Resilience

COP30 reaffirmed the Adaptation Fund's role as a key channel for financing concrete adaptation projects in developing countries and adopted updated guidance to strengthen its responsiveness. The decision emphasises direct access modalities, simplified approval processes, and enhanced readiness support to help vulnerable countries prepare high-quality proposals. It also encourages the Fund to align its programming with the newly adopted Belém Adaptation Indicators, ensuring that funded projects contribute to measurable resilience outcomes without imposing additional reporting burdens. Importantly, COP30 urged the Adaptation Fund to prioritise grant-based finance and scale resources to match the political signal of tripling adaptation finance by 2035. The decision calls for closer coordination with the Green Climate Fund and other operating entities to avoid duplication and leverage synergies, particularly in sectors such as water, agriculture, health, and climate-resilient infrastructure. For developing countries, including India, this guidance matters because it promises faster, more predictable access to adaptation finance for projects like climate-proofing rural livelihoods, upgrading urban drainage systems, and strengthening early warning systems. However, the decision also acknowledges persistent gaps: current flows remain far below estimated needs, and success will depend on sustained replenishment and streamlined governance. COP30 thus positions the Adaptation Fund as a critical instrument for translating global adaptation goals into local action.

Operationalising the Loss and Damage Fund

At COP30, Parties advanced operational guidance for the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD), building on its establishment at COP27 and initial capitalisation steps at COP28. The Belém decision welcomed progress on the Fund's governance arrangements and endorsed the Barbados Implementation Modalities, which prioritise grant-based interventions for vulnerable countries facing irreversible climate impacts. The decision emphasises country ownership, direct access, and simplified procedures to ensure timely disbursement – critical for communities already experiencing catastrophic losses from floods, cyclones, and slow-onset events. COP30 also requested the Fund's Board to finalise its long-term operating model by 2026, including predictable replenishment cycles and coordination with other financial entities under the UNFCCC. For developing countries, this is politically significant: it signals that loss and damage finance will not be treated as charity but as a structured obligation, complementing adaptation and mitigation support under Article 9. The decision also calls for transparency and equity safeguards, ensuring that resources reach frontline communities without onerous conditionalities. While the Fund's initial pledges remain modest compared to estimated needs, COP30's guidance sets the stage for scaling up resources and integrating loss and damage into the broader climate finance architecture, making it a cornerstone for climate justice in the coming decade.

The Belém Technology Implementation Programme

The Belém Technology Implementation Programme (TIP), launched at COP30, is designed to bridge the gap between assessed technological needs and real-world deployment. Building on the Technology Mechanism's first periodic assessment, the decision responds to concerns that technical assistance often stops at planning and fails to deliver implementation. TIP's mandate is to strengthen support for deploying technologies prioritised by developing countries in their NDCs, National Adaptation Plans, and long-term strategies. It focuses on practical enablers: matchmaking for partnerships, mobilising finance through Financial Mechanism, and addressing systemic barriers such as procurement bottlenecks and capacity constraints. COP30 explicitly ties TIP to the 1.5 °C pathway, signalling its role in accelerating mitigation and adaptation technologies – from smart grids and energy storage to climate-resilient agriculture and digital MRV systems. The decision also calls for enhanced collaboration between the Technology Executive Committee, the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), and financial entities like the GCF and GEF to ensure coherent support. For countries like India, TIP offers an opportunity to package technology portfolios – covering industrial decarbonisation, renewable integration, and resilience solutions – into programmatic proposals eligible for multilateral funding. Politically, TIP reflects a shift from rhetoric to delivery: it operationalises technology transfer as a cornerstone of equity, ensuring that ambition is matched by tools to implement it on the ground.

The Tropical Forests Forever Facility

Although outside the UNFCCC process, the Tropical Forests Forever Facility (TFFF), launched just before COP30, represents a landmark financing model aimed at rewarding developing countries for conserving tropical forests – critical carbon sinks and biodiversity hotspots. Unlike traditional project-based funding, TFFF is designed as a permanent incentive mechanism, offering predictable, long-term financial flows to more than 70 tropical forest nations. Endorsed by 53 countries at its launch, with Brazil and Indonesia making initial commitments, the facility seeks to mobilise resources from public and private actors to create a sustainable revenue stream for forest protection.

Its significance for developing countries lies in two dimensions. First, it addresses a chronic gap in climate finance by linking conservation outcomes to assured payments, reducing reliance on fragmented, short-term grants. This model can stabilise national budgets for forest governance, land tenure security, and community-based conservation, while avoiding debt burdens. Second, TFFF exemplifies cooperative implementation of the Paris Agreement as it operationalises Article 5 on forests and complements mitigation and adaptation goals by embedding nature-based solutions into global climate strategies. By incentivising forest stewardship, TFFF also strengthens equity, recognising that tropical nations provide global ecosystem services and deserve predictable support. If scaled effectively, this facility could become a template for performance-based finance that aligns climate ambition with sustainable development priorities in the Global South.

Global Stocktake

At COP30 in Belém, the GST entered its next phase after completing the first cycle at COP28. The decision adopted at COP30 focuses on operationalising GST follow-up rather than reopening debates on ambition. It establishes a facilitative, non-prescriptive dialogue process, known as the UAE Dialogue, which will convene annually through 2027. These dialogues aim to help Parties share experiences, identify barriers, and mobilise enabling conditions – finance, technology, and capacity building – needed to implement the Paris Agreement's goals. Importantly, the decision emphasises that these dialogues will produce factual summaries, not compliance assessments, and will respect national circumstances and sovereignty. This approach reflects a deliberate choice to make GST a cooperative mechanism for accelerating delivery rather than a punitive scoreboard.

For developing countries, the political significance of this decision is profound. First, it ensures that GST follow-up remains implementation-oriented, creating structured spaces to highlight gaps in support rather than imposing new obligations. Second, it links GST outcomes to practical enablers, reinforcing that ambition must be matched by scaled-up finance and technology transfer under Article 9.1. This is critical for countries like India, which face large investment needs for renewable integration, industrial decarbonisation, and climate-resilient infrastructure. Third, the timeline of annual dialogues through 2027 provides predictability and multiple entry points for developing countries to influence global implementation architecture before the next stocktake in 2028. By embedding equity and cooperation at the heart of GST follow-up, COP30 transforms the stocktake from a retrospective exercise into a forward-looking engine for delivery – one that developing countries can use to secure resources, shape norms, and advance just transitions.

The Contentious Unilateral Trade Measures

At COP30, the debate over unilateral trade measures emerged as one of the most contentious issues, reflecting the growing intersection of climate and trade policy. Several developed countries, particularly those in the EU, defended Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)-type measures as tools to prevent carbon leakage and maintain competitiveness while advancing decarbonisation. They argued that such mechanisms incentivise global climate ambition by aligning trade with emissions standards. However, developing countries – including India and members of the G77/China – strongly opposed these unilateral measures, warning that they risk becoming disguised trade barriers that penalise exporters from economies still grappling with development challenges. The Like Minded Developing Countries argued that these measures, if left unchecked, could function as disguised trade barriers, penalising exports from developing countries and undermining the principle of CBDR-RC. These measures contradict the cooperative spirit of the Paris Agreement and risk shifting the burden of climate action onto producers in the Global South without providing finance or technology support. The negotiations were tense, with developing countries pressing for language that would subject unilateral trade measures to multilateral scrutiny under the UNFCCC. Ultimately, COP30 delivered a breakthrough by mandating the first-ever UNFCCC dialogue on climate-related trade measures, scheduled for 2026-2028. This decision creates a formal space to examine the implications, assess compatibility with equity principles, and explore cooperative alternatives such as technology transfer and concessional finance to such measures. For developing countries, this outcome is politically significant as it prevents unilateral trade measures from becoming normalised without challenge and opens a pathway to embed fairness in the evolving trade-climate interface. While the dialogue does not impose binding rules, it signals that climate ambition must advance through cooperation, not coercion.

The Road Ahead

Belém's outcomes shift the centre of gravity toward implementation, adaptation, finance architecture, and just transition – areas consistent with India's development-first mitigation approach. The decisions on the two-year climate finance work programme, trade dialogues, GGA indicators, and the just transition mechanism open practical channels for India to secure concessional finance, contest trade barriers, measure adaptation progress credibly, and design people-centered transitions. Looking ahead, India will engage in dialogues on operationalising the NCQG (USD 300 bn by 2035), ambition-raising through the Belém Mission and Global Implementation Accelerator, piloting adaptation metrics, and shaping trade principles to prevent disguised restrictions. These processes, running through 2028, provide developing countries, particularly India, with multiple entry points to influence global norms while advancing domestic priorities for equity, resilience, and inclusive growth. From developing countries' perspective, going forward, core priorities will be: safeguarding Article 9.1 finance obligations, defending equity and CBDR-RC, and opposing unilateral trade-restrictive climate measures such as CBAM, which risk penalising developing-country exports without providing technology or finance support. •

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